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Abstract: Cloud computing is a phenomenon that is changing information technology, with many 
companies no longer having data and resources retained within their own premises. Instead they are utilising 
cloud computing and its centralised resources. There are many benefits of this approach such as pay-per-use 
model, elasticity of operation and on demand resourcing. However, this approach also introduces additional 
security challenges. Security involves a triad of considerations, those being confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, often abbreviated to CIA. This work focusses on the last aspect of the CIA triad – availability, 
which is even more crucial for cloud-based platforms as centralised resources need to be provided at a 
distance to the end customers. Several factors including ‘denial of service’ attack impact availability. 
Moreover, current protection frameworks do not sufficiently consider the issues of verification, scalability 
and end-to-end latency. Hence, a new framework has been designed to fill the identified gap. The framework 
referred to as the cloud-based Distributed Denial of Service Alleviation System (DDoSAS) is based on its 
predecessor Enhanced DDoS-MS. The new framework has been implemented using Amazon Web Services. 
The work serves to provide a baseline for measuring end-to-end latency in real-life scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of cloud computing is shifting the information technology landscape. The 
significance and magnitude of this industry can be illustrated by the prediction made by Gartner that 
this sector would be worth $411 billion by 2020 [1]. There are multiple reasons why this technology 
is becoming increasingly popular, including its pay-per-use model, and its scalability and elasticity. 
However, there are security challenges associated with this new technology, that can be split into the 
well know CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability. While there are multiple attack 
vectors that directly or indirectly affect the first and second area, the work reported here focusses on 
the third area – availability. Availability of the service is crucial to cloud computing, as it is entirely 
reliant on delivering its services at a distance. Several attack vectors including, but not limited to, 
denial of service and distributed denial of service attacks, can curtail availability. The work reported 
here is targeting this subset of availability threats. 
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The attacks have a relatively unsophisticated modus operandi, where an adversary seeks to 
overwhelm the targeted resources with illegitimate requests. Possible resource targets can be the 
connecting network line and its bandwidth, or a server’s CPU resources. At the point when the 
resource has no capacity left to keep the service operational, the availability is affected, and the service 
becomes unavailable for use by legitimate users. Despite several proposed frameworks that attempt 
to tackle this kind of malicious behaviour, no comprehensive research has been conducted that 
facilitates solutions that deal with the three significant issues of traffic verification, scalability and 
latency. The solution described here builds on the Enhanced Distributed Denial of Services Mitigation 
System Framework [2] to fill the gap. This new framework has been named the Cloud based 
Distributed Denial of Service Alleviation System (DDoSAS).  
2. Cloud Computing and Security Context 
Although cloud computing involves complex systems, the fundamental idea can be described 
with a certain level of abstraction as a combination of centralisation and virtualisation approaches. 
Using a combination of these two approaches the central resource can be optimally utilised to service 
several customers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology [3] has articulated several 
characteristics of the cloud: on-demand self-service; broad network access; resource pooling; rapid 
elasticity; and, measured service. 
Cloud computing can be provided as a service using varied combinations of three common 
models: Infrastructure as a Service – IaaS; Platform as a Service – PaaS; and, Software as a Service – 
SaaS. IaaS involves providing hardware resources to the subscribed customer. PaaS, is similar to IaaS 
but in addition to the hardware resource, provides a pre-created environment that can be used 
directly. SaaS provides a direct service to the customer without them needing to consider explicitly 
resourcing.   
Cloud computing can be deployed in three common scenarios: private, public and hybrid.  
These environments can be subject to attacks that focus on threats to availability. The current 
mitigation frameworks do not comprehensively consider the triad of scalability, packet verification 
and latency [2].  
The mitigation techniques can be defined in terms of the place of function: source-based, 
network-based, or victim-based. Source-based solutions are located near to the source of the traffic, 
that is close to potential attacker, and have the advantage that the traffic is captured even before it 
reaches the public network, and therefore the public infrastructure is saved the effort of delivering 
unsolicited malicious traffic to the targeted server. However, due to the nature of the public network, 
it requires the significant involvement of all parties that have access to it. Network-based solutions 
are deployed within the public infrastructure, for example with cooperation of Internet Service 
Providers, resulting in a reduction in the number of entities involved in the collaboration. Victim-
based solutions, deployed close to the subject that might be target of attack, minimise the number of 
collaborating entities.  
While the first categorisation is based on place of application, the second categorisation is based 
on the time of application. The solution can be proactive or reactive. Proactive means that the solution 
is not waiting for an attack to start but is active even when there is no attack and mitigates even the 
possibility of an attack beginning. A reactive solution only responds when an attack is detected.  
3. Cloud based Distributed Denial of Service Alleviation System 
The new solution is proactive, targeting all traffic regardless of the current status. The 
framework is active whether dealing with a normal and legitimate load or in an under the attack 
scenario. The benefit of this approach is that there is no reaction time necessary whereas with a re-
active system when an attack is detected there is a latency while response function is initiated. The 
solution is one that is victim-based. 
The solution consists of five sectional functional elements (see Figure 1). The first functional 
element, the firewall, has the key role of arbiter on whether traffic is allowed to progress. The firewall 
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uses information about the sources, including the IP source address and TTL value, to determine its 
decision. The firewall also corelates information about the source, including any malicious payload 
in packets and suspected abuse by a verified human user.  
The second functional element, the verification cluster provides information about the sources 
through utilization of human detection mechanism. The system used to distinguish between humans 
and automated systems is CAPTCHA [4]. The third functional element provides an additional level 
of protection through the Crypto-Puzzle cluster and gives further clarification on the source of the 
traffic.  The fourth element is deep packet inspection and is performed through the Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS). The payload can contain malicious content in the packet payload; the 
payload could cause availability issues, as a single low and slow type of attack, which can 
significantly strain system handling the request.  The fifth functional element of the framework is 
the reverse proxy that serves as an additional layer of anonymization of the location for the protected 
resources. The reverse proxy receives the request before forwarding it together with its identification 
attributes, which means that the location of the protected server is kept hidden. The reverse proxy 
also verifies users and counts the number of requests in a given time per connection to make sure 
that the human users are utilizing the service in an expected and legitimate workflow. 
 
Figure 1. Architecture diagram of Cloud based Districted Denial of Service Alleviation System. 
3. 1. Key differences of the Cloud based Distributed Denial of Service Alleviation System 
The evolutionary step that led to the improved framework is specified by several modifications 
that are articulated below.  
1. The position for the deployed solution has changed. The preferred location for deployment of 
the predecessor is the customer’s edge network. The intention is to provide the security 
measures before the traffic even reaches the public connectivity network. When deployed in 
the customer’s edge it can act on network traffic that either originates from that network 
directly or that is passing through that part of the network. The challenge that it poses is that 
this security protection framework will not see network communication that does not satisfy 
either of those two criteria. A customer that is subscribed to the cloud service can work from 
any location in the world, however if the protection is deployed at customer’s edge it would 
negate this inherent type of cloud computing benefit. Users that are not within the dedicated 
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network would, in effect, not be covered by the framework’s protection and could be the source 
of the attack against the protected resource. The use-case includes situations when the 
framework is both effective and not effective within the defined scope. The outcome of the 
non-effective situation is one that describes a malicious intention of a user that is part of the 
customer edge network. In this case the advisory would be able to use an option to utilise 
tunnelling solutions that would encrypt all the traffic and send it to the exit node, which would 
be outside of the guarded customer’s edge network. That would lead to the previous scenario 
where the malicious actor is effectively any other person outside of the customer’s edge 
network. If the cloud network edge only accepted traffic from that customer’s network edge, 
it would mean that the accessibility and availability of the cloud would be restricted. 
Based on the conceptual analysis of the scenarios it is necessary to evolve this solution and 
change its placement to the cloud provider’s edge. This would satisfy both scenarios 
considered earlier, where the solution would be restricted to only the customer’s edge network 
or can be opened to the allow the wider public accessibility, thereby not restricting the 
accessibility and availability of the cloud resources to the subscriber’s network.  
2. The technological stack that is used to build the framework has been changed. Changing the 
concept of the place of deployment allows the framework to be run on a virtual platform 
directly in the cloud. Virtualisation significantly reduces the initial costs of framework 
deployment compared to the on-premise solution. The technological advancement connected 
to the stack technology is a point of replication. Replication can be done through infrastructure 
as a code approach. Therefore, not just the framework logic but the framework itself can be 
implemented via a software solution. Replication can be achieved via software defined 
automation, which can be accommodated within the cloud computing environment. The new 
framework is built with the replication and automation factors in mind. Therefore, the 
framework can work with single tenant as well as multi-tenant architectures. A single tenant 
solution could be further divided into two options. The first would mean that the framework 
would be restricted to the network subset of a customer, and the customer network edge 
network, while the second would be similar but not impose the origin of the customer network 
end subnet. The multi-tenant architecture would allow a single framework for multiple 
customers.  
3. Redundancy has been improved at two levels: that is, through improvements to the separate 
elements and to the overall framework. The new framework provides capability for both 
single-tenant and multi-tenant scenarios. Redundancy improvements at framework level can 
be achieved through automation and software defined infrastructure, which leads to possible 
replication and redundancy of the framework for each customer. The improvement to separate 
framework elements provides the redundancy and resiliency in a sense of the components 
themselves. A framework element can automatically replace itself in case of possible health 
failure. The contextual analysis shows that the change is desirable for the front facing 
components that could pose a single point of failure.  
4. Experimental results evaluation 
The framework has been implemented using Amazon Web Services (AWS cloud), a rapidly 
expanding provider [5]. To facilitate cross comparable results the framework was benchmarked 
against its predecessor. Moreover, to achieve a verification on a higher scale, the scale was 
intentionally increased in both metrics of quantity of the traffic that the framework had to handle and 
the intensity of the load that sent into the framework. 
4.1. Cross comparison experiments  
Three distinct experiments were designed to investigate dynamic scenarios that involved 
varying the traffic intensity within each traffic load being sent to the framework. The first focused on 
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increase in the traffic intensity, the second on a situation where there is traffic fluctuation, the third 
where there is a significant increase and decrease of the traffic intensity. Each cross-comparison 
scenario consisted of one thousand ICMP requests within each stream. Therefore, each network 
stream consisted of two thousand network packets. 
4.1.1 First cross dynamic comparison experiment  
The results for the defined load are shown in Figure 2. The solid line represents the response 
time and the dashed line the time for processing the ICMP responses. There is a significant increase 
for ICMP request number 2084 which had a response time 0. 543ms. This is an exceptional anomaly 
that might be cause by other data passing through the public environment. 
 
Figure 2. Results of the first dynamic comparison scenario. 
To better understand the results, statistical information about the traffic is shown in Table 1. 
Note that the lowest response time is during the fourth stream that was defined by highest traffic 
intensity. In additional the statistics confirm that the maximal initial response time relates to the 
network anomaly mentioned earlier, resulting in the slowest response time of 0.543ms 





intensity per second 









1st stream 100 0.16756 0.14600 0.38800 
2nd stream 50 0.17329 0.15400 0.24700 
3rd stream 500 0.15617 0.13300 0.54300 
4th stream 1000 0.15055 0.13100 0.29200 
Entire load - 0.16189 0.13100 0.54300 
Table 2. Distributions of the response times across the first dynamic comparison scenario. 
Time difference with regards to the average 
response time [seconds] 
Number of responses  Percentage 
[%] 
0.001 16 0.40% 
0.0001 78 1.95% 
0.00005 3906 97.65% 
-0.00005 0 0.00% 
-0.0001 0 0.00% 
-0.001 0 0.00% 
Total 4000 100.00% 
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Enhanced analysis of the response time is presented in Table 2. The response time of the packets 
show that almost 98% of the traffic has been processed in 0.05ms time window from the average 
response time. This would suggest that the framework is managing the traffic in a consistent manner, 
even if the traffic quantity is variable. 
4.1.2 Second cross dynamic comparison experiment  
The second dynamic scenario was used to model the fluctuations in traffic intensity that often 
occur in real-world situations. The analysis is presented in Table 3. 





intensity per second 










1st stream  500 0.15161 0.13500 0.39800 
2nd stream 1000 0.14777 0.13000 0.25600 
3rd stream  50 0.16577 0.15200 0.31600 
4th stream  100 0.15614 0.14200 0.25100 
Entire load - 0.15532 0.13000 0.39800 
This provides further clarification to the first dynamic scenario. The lowest average response 
time was reached during the higher intensity of the traffic. Distribution of the response time 
window’s management is provided in Table 4. The analysis shows that 99.4% of all traffic was 
processed within in 0.05ms. The table provides clarification on the consistency on the traffic 
processing.  
Table 4. Distributions of the response times across the second dynamic comparison scenario. 
Time difference with regards to the 
average response time [s] 




0.001 3 0.08% 
0.0001 21 0.53% 
0.00005 3976 99.40% 
-0.00005 0 0.00% 
-0.0001 0 0.00% 
-0.001 0 0.00% 
Total 4000 100.00% 
4.1.3 Third cross dynamic comparison experiment  
The third scenario was designed to test the framework when subjected to significant increase 
and then decrease in traffic. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. 




intensity per second 










1st stream 50 0.16442 0.14900 0.37400 
2nd stream 1000 0.15066 0.13500 0.26600 
3rd stream 100 0.15748 0.14100 0.24200 
4th stream 500 0.15172 0.14000 0.24200 
Entire load - 0.15607 0.13500 0.37400 
The scenario also shows the lowest response time during the highest intensity of the traffic. 
Analysis of the distribution of the response time window is shown in Table 6. The table shows that 
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Table 6. Distributions of the response times across the third dynamic comparison scenario. 
Time difference with regards to 
the average response time [s] 




0.001 4 0.10% 
0.0001 79 1.98% 
0.00005 3917 97.93% 
-0.00005 0 0.00% 
-0.0001 0 0.00% 
-0.001 0 0.00% 
Total 4000 100.00% 
4.2. Cross dynamic comparison evaluation 
Each dynamic comparison scenario was conducted with the same quantity as well as intensity 
of the traffic. This particular set up of the dynamic scenarios allows further cross-referencing with 
previous dynamic scenarios conducted for the Enhanced DDoS-MS framework. Each of these 
scenarios contained multiple different stream intensities and the analysis focused on each stream as 
well as across the whole scenario.   
The initial statistical analysis is presented in Table 7, where streams were separately analysed to 
provide insight regarding minimal, average and maximum response times. The table provides this 
information in order of the stream intensity. To make the compression clear the table shows the 
response time per intensity for each solution. The two-response times were deducted from each other 
to provide the response time difference in described cases. The difference is also calculated in terms 
of the percentage perspective. The results show that the average response time for one hundred 
packets per second is 0.565ms for the predecessor, and the newly new framework can handle the 
same quantity and intensity with the average response time 0.168ms. As shown in the table this 
means a time difference of 0.397ms, which represents 337 percent difference in comparison with the 
result achieved by the predecessor. This stream was taken as an example as it achieved the largest 
difference across comparable experiments. The results show that across these streams that the 
difference was in the milliseconds ranges, meaning in most cases an improvement of several hundred 
percent. 







response time Cloud 









50 AVG 0.544 0.173 0.371 314% 
50 MIN 0.415 0.154 0.261 269% 
50 MAX 0.767 0.247 0.520 311% 
100 AVG 0.565 0.168 0.397 337% 
100 MIN 0.394 0.146 0.248 270% 
100 MAX 0.830 0.388 0.442 214% 
500 AVG 0.454 0.156 0.298 291% 
500 MIN 0.337 0.133 0.204 253% 
500 MAX 0.595 0.543 0.052 110% 
1000 AVG 0.410 0.151 0.259 272% 
1000 MIN 0.333 0.131 0.202 254% 
1000 MAX 0.549 0.292 0.257 188% 
All AVG 0.493 0.162 0.331 305% 
All MIN 0.370 0.141 0.229 262% 
All MAX 0.685 0.368 0.318 186% 
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Higher level of visibility was achieved with similar analysis that included second and third 
comparable scenarios. It showed that the response time difference differs by 305 percent. Analysis 
showed that the minimal reached 262 percent and maximal response time had 186 percent difference. 
It suggests the while in general traffic is processed three time faster, the maximal response time are 
less than twice as fast. A possible explanation for this is that external factors are influencing some of 
the requests, which are then processed and delivered slower. This however is not happening to most 
of the traffic as the average response time results are in higher improvement rates. 
The second and third dynamic comparable scenarios were analysed in the same manner. The 
observation that was identified within the first comparable scenario is visible also in these scenarios. 
The maximal response times have the lowest improvement; however, it is still faster than its 
predecessor.  
4.3. Enhanced dimensions experiment 
To provide further clarification on scalability, availability and verification, an additional 
experiment was conducted varying multiple input parameters. Here the quantity of the traffic was 
increased as well as the intensity of the traffic generated. The first comparison scenario served as a 
blueprint of the enhanced dimensions experiment. The intensity of the network packet generation 
was increased by five hundred percent. The same level of increase was applied to the quantity of 
traffic generated and sent towards the protected system and then processed through the framework. 
Therefore, the number of ICMP requests was raised to five thousand and the total traffic reached ten 
thousand within each stream.  
The initial quantity was eight thousand packets, and thus when increased by a factor of five 
reached forty thousand packets. Moreover, while the maximal intensity of the traffic was initially one 
thousand packets generated per second it was increased to five thousand packets. Figure 3 graphs 
the results obtained.  
 
 
Figure 3. Results of the enhanced dimensions scenario. 
The graph shows that there are several exceptions in the response times that significantly exceed 
the average. Table 8 provides the statistical analysis of this experimental scenario.  
The lowest response time is 0.083ms, the highest response time is 0.386ms and the average 
response time of the experiment is 0.105ms. This experiment is a crucial in view of the previously 
identified observation that the framework achieves lowest response times during the highest 
intensities. In this situation the lowest response time is not achieved during the highest intensity of 
the five thousand packets per second that was generated in the second stream. The analyses of the 
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distribution of the response times in the 0.05ms window from the average response time is shown in 
Table 9. 




intensity per second 










1st stream 250 0.10547 0.09800 0.36800 
2nd stream 5000 0.10567 0.10000 0.20200 
3rd stream 500 0.10500 0.09700 0.20100 
4th stream 2500 0.10512 0.08300 0.20100 
Entire load - 0.10533 0.08300 0.36800 
Table 9. Distributions of the response times across the enhanced dimensions scenario. 
Time difference with regards to the 







0.001 4 0.02% 
0.0001 41 0.21% 
0.00005 19955 99.78% 
-0.00005 0 0.00% 
-0.0001 0 0.00% 
-0.001 0 0.00% 
SUM: 20000 100.00% 
The distribution table suggests that the rate of responses served within 0.05ms is consistent with 
the previous comparisons scenarios, as it is kept at the same levels. More precisely it achieved the 
highest percentage of the packets processed within this timeframe in comparison with all the 
previous comparison scenarios. 
5. Concluding Discussions 
Increasingly businesses are adopting cloud computing facilities that rely on non-private 
computer networks. This raises a number of security concerns that must be addressed. This paper 
focuses on one aspect of these concerns, namely denial of service attacks. The paper presents the 
Cloud based Distributed Denial of Service Alleviation System framework (DDoSAS) that has been 
implemented using Amazon Web Services. This real-life environment facilitated experiments that 
highlighted an efficiency, in terms of end-to-end latency, substantially better than obtained with 
previous frameworks and faster response times during higher traffic intensity. Moreover, the new 
framework can handle five thousand requests per second and still achieve an average response time 
of 0.105 millisecond. Observation spanning across all the conducted scenarios show that above 97 
percent of all requests are handled within 0.05 ms from the average response time, which suggests 
that the framework provides consistency regardless of traffic load, dynamic scenario or intensity. 
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